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IN THE UTAH COURT QF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
VS. 
GEORGE OLIVER DUMAS, 
AppelIant/Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A., 
section 7S-2a-3(2)(j). 
NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Defendant's four convictions, pursuant to 
a bench trial before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson sitting in 
Summit County, Utah, stemming from a four count information (Count I: 
Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft by 
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by Receiving, 
U.C.A., section 76-6-408, and; Count IV: Habitual Criminal, U.C.A., 
section 76-8-1001). 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court err by convicting the Defendant under two 
separate counts of Theft by Receiving (Count I: as to the 1972 GMC 
and Count II: as to the snowmobile) when both items were stolen in a 
single criminal episode from the same individual. 
2. Did the Court err by convicting the Defendant of Theft by 
Receiving, pursuant to Counts I, II, and III, where each of these 
CASE NO. 890643-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
Counts in the information fails to delineate whether the Defendant 
was being charged with Theft by Receiving or Theft by Concealing. 
3. Did the Court err by convicting Defendant under Count I: 
Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft by 
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by Receiving, 
U.C.A., section 76-6-408 based upon insufficient evidence. 
4. Did the Court err by convicting the Defendant under Count IV 
(Habitual Criminal) when one of the previous underlying felonies was 
committed prior to the enactment of the Habitual Criminal Statute 
(U.C.A. 76-8-1001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a four count information with 
Count I: Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft 
by Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by 
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408, and; Count IV: Habitual 
Criminal, U.C.A., section 76-8-1001. 
Based upon an anonymous tip regarding the operation of a "chop 
shop," conveyed to Salt Lake County Sheriff Pete Hayward, Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Detective Gay lord Dent and four other members of the 
Automobile Theft Squad went to Wills Auto Repair in Oakley, Utah on 
February 16, 1989. Upon arrival on the scene the officers observed 
several vehicles on the premises outside the building. Of the 
several vehicles observed, one, a 1972 GMC, matched the description 
of a vehicle recently stolen in Salt Lake City from a Larry Anderson. 
Detective Dent went to the vehicle, obtained a vehicle identification 
number, and confirmed that the vehicle had been stolen from Larry 
Anderson in Salt Lake City. The officers found no individuals on the 
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premises at this time and left stolen vehicle on the premises. The 
officers then procE?eded to the residence of Art Wilkinson in Samak, 
Utah where they observed a Yamaha snowmobile which had also been 
reported stolen from Larry Anderson in Salt Lake City. The officers 
found no one at the? Wilkinson residence or on the premises and left 
the snowmobile on the premises and returned to Salt Lake County. 
Both the 1972 GMC and the Yamaha snowmobile belonged to Larry 
Anderson and had been reported by him as stolen on or about February 
16, 1989 from the parking lot of a Fred Meyer store in Salt Lake 
City. 
Detective Dent then proceeded to conduct a "stake-out" of the 
premises known as Wills Auto Repair in Oakley, Utah. The "stake-out" 
was conducted on February 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27, 
1989. On these occasions Detective Dent conducted surveillance of 
the premises at various times, however, mostly at night. During the 
surveillance, Detective Dent noticed numerous individuals leave and 
enter the building freely. Detective Dent observed that the stolen 
1972 GMC vehicle had been moved into the middle bay of the garage but 
did not see anyone move the vehicle. On two occasions during the 
surveillance (February 16 and February 23) Detective Dent was 
accompanied by Detective Harold Steffee. During the surveillance the 
officers observed the following: 
A. Many individuals enter and leave the premises freely at all 
times of the night; 
B. Many individuals driving vehicles up to the premises, 
however, the officers never ran checks on the vehicles nor license 
plates they observed; 
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C. Defendant was observed on the premises only once during the 
surveillance on February 23, 1989 and that was merely by an open 
garage bay door while several other individuals were also on the 
premises; 
D. The officers never saw anyone operating any of the vehicles 
nor working on any of the vehicles; 
E- On or about February 28, 1989 when Detective Dent conducted 
his surveillance he observed the stolen snowmobile (previously 
observed on 2/16/89 at Art Wilkinson's residence in Samak, Utah) on 
the premises at Wills Auto, some 25 feet from the building; 
F. During the surveillance Detective Dent never observed anyone 
near the snowmobile; 
G- On or about February 25, 1989 when Detective Dent conducted 
his surveillance he observed a U-Haul transport trailer (later 
determined to be stolen) on the premises at Wills Auto, some 25 feet 
from the building; 
H. During the surveillance Detective Dent never observed anyone 
near the U-Haul trailer; 
On February 28, 1989 Detective Dent and members of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office, in conjunction with members of the Summit 
County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on the premises in 
Oakley, Utah (Wills Auto). The warrant was executed at about 9 A.M. 
in the morning, the officers were readily able to enter the building 
and, upon entry found the Defendant and his wife in the building. 
Based upon these events, Defendant was charged under the four 
count information. (R91 pg- 19, 1.1 to pg. 94, 1.3) 
Defendant, pursuant to a bench trial before the Honorable 
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Timothy R. Hanson, was convicted on all four counts and it is from 
these convictions that Defendant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1- The Court erred by convicting and sentencing the Defendant 
under two separate counts of Theft by Receiving (Count I: as to the 
1972 GMC and Count II: as to the snowmobile) when the items of 
property which were the res of the thefts were stolen in a single 
criminal episode from the same individual. 
2. The Court erred by convicting and sentencing the Defendant 
under Count I: Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: 
Theft by Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; and Count III: Theft by 
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408 where none of the Counts properly 
delineated a crime, to wit: either Theft by Receiving or Theft by 
Concealing, but merely recited the statutory language of U.C.A., 
section 76-6-408. 
3. The Court erred by convicting Defendant under Count I: Theft 
by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft by Receiving, 
U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by Receiving, U.C.A., 
section 76-6-408 based upon insufficient evidence, to wit: State 
proved no more than Defendant's mere proximity to stolen property or 
Defendant's presence near property or premises and failed to prove 
Defendant's dominion and control over property or premises. 
4. The Court erred by convicting the Defendant under Count IV 
(Habitual Criminal) when one of the previous underlying felonies was 
committed prior to the enactment of the Habitual Criminal Statute 
(U.C.A. 76-8-1001) and thus makes such an application of the Statute 
an ex post facto law. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DID THE COURT ERR BY CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT UNDER TWO 
SEPARATE COUNTS OF THEFT BY RECEIVING (COUNT I: AS TO THE 
1972 GMC AND COUNT II: AS TO THE SNOWMOBILE) WHEN BOTH ITEMS 
WERE STOLEN IN A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE FROM THE SAME 
INDIVIDUAL-
Count I of the Information under which Defendant was charged, 
which was amended at trial (R92 pg. 3-5, 1. 21) charged the Defendant 
with Theft by Receiving, U-C-A, section 76-6-408, to wit: an operable 
motor vehicle of Larry Andersen or, in the alternative, property 
exceeding one thousand dollars in value. Count I I of the Information 
under which Defendant was charged, charged the Defendant with Theft 
by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408, to wit: property belonging to 
Larry Anderson valued at more than $250.00 but less than $1,000.00. 
It was clear from the trial testimony of Larry Anderson that 
both the property which formed the basis of Count I (the 1972 GMC 
Truck) and the property which formed the basis of Count II (the 
snowmobile) were taken at the same time during one criminal episode. 
(R91 pg. 121, 1. 11-25) Due to the lack of evidence presented by the 
State during the trial, the State cannot separate the items stolen at 
the same time in one criminal episode and make each separate item the 
basis of separate criminal counts. (State v. Casias, 106 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 52; 1989) 
The only permissible way that the State could have separated the 
items taken at the same time during one criminal episode and made 
each item the basis on a separate criminal count would be if the 
State proved at trial that the stolen items were not received by the 
-6-
Defendant on one occasion. This principle was set forth in the case 
of State v. Bair, 671 P2d 203 (Utah, 1983) wherein the Court stated 
at page 206: 
"If the evidence does not satisfy this condition, but instead 
shows that the stolen articles were all received on one occasion, 
then the converse of the foregoing rule is true, i.e., the receipt is 
considered a single offense and must be prosecuted as one crime....If 
the Defendant's receipt of the various stolen guns occurred on only 
one occasion, it definitely satisfied the 'closely related in time' 
requirement of the single criminal episode statute, as well as the 
'single criminal objective' requirements thereof...." (citing: State 
v. Bell, 560 P2d 951 [N.M., 1977] and State v. Kuhnley, 242 P2d 843 
CAz., 19523) 
The Court in the BAIR case continued at page 207 (citing the 
case of State v. Clark, 497 P2d 1210 I0r., 1972]) by stating: 
"If the State contended the articles were received or concealed 
by the Defendant on separate occasions, it was incumbent upon it to 
offer evidence to that effect." 
In the case presently before the State failed to prove or offer 
any evidence that the articles in question were received by the 
Defendant on separate occasions. 
It should also be noted that the information under which 
Defendant was charged and convicted alleges that each "receiving of 
stolen goods," delineated in Count I, Count II, and Count III 
occurred on the same day, to wit: February 28, 1989. 
As such, the burden of proof for the State, as discussed above, 
becomes even more important and, as indicated by the trial record, 
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more conspicuous in its absence. 
Therefore, the Court erred in permitting Defendant to be charged 
and convicted under Counts I and II. 
As to Count III of the Information: Count III of the Information 
under which Defendant was charged and convicted, charged the 
Defendant with Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408, to wit: 
property belonging to U-Haul exceeding $1,000.00 in value. For the 
reasons stated above Count III must likewise be stricken. Once 
again, as the Court stated in the BAIR case: 
•'Both the Plaintiff s argument and the trial court s ruling on 
the issue are based upon a false premise. They assume that the same 
evidence which shows that the various articles of stolen property 
were actually 'taken' on three separate occasions also serves as 
evidence that Defendant received these stolen articles on the same 
three occasions. This assumption is entirely misplaced. That proof of 
the date of the actual taking does not necessarily establish the 
date of receipt for purposes of the charge of receiving stolen 
property has been determined in previous cases." 
Once again, the record is void of any evidence presented at 
trial which would establish not only that the Defendant received the 
property but which would establish that the Defendant received the 
property on more than one occasion. 
POINT II 
DID THE COURT ERR BY CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT OF THEFT BY 
RECEIVING, PURSUANT TO COUNTS I, II, AND III, WHERE EACH OF 
THESE COUNTS IN THE INFORMATION FAILS TO DELINEATE WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANT WAS BEING CHARGED WITH THEFT BY RECEIVING OR THEFT BY 
CONCEALING. 
The wording of Counts I, II, and III of the information are 
-S_ 
essentially identical charging that the Defendant "received, 
retained, disposed of, concealed, sold, or withheld..." the property 
of another. 
The Defendant contends that the way Counts I, II, and III of the 
Information were worded, neither Count I, Count II, nor Count III 
charges the Defendant with an actionable crime. Defendant bases this 
argument on the case of State v. Ramon, 736 P2d 1059 (Utah App. 1987) 
wherein this very Appellate Court ruled that the crime of receiving 
stolen property is a separate and distinct crime from concealing 
stolen property. (See also: State v. Murphy, 617 P2d 339 [Utah, 
1980]; State v. Lamm, 606 P2d 229 [Utah, 1980]; State v. Pappas, 705 
P2d 1169 [Utah, 1985]) 
Since the wording of Counts I, II, and III of the Information do 
not adhere to the distinction made in the RAMON case and in 
conjunction with the wording found in Rule 9 of the Utah rules of 
Criminal Procedure (U.C.A. 77-35-9), the Information must be stricken 
as insufficient to charge a crime and the convictions rendered 
pursuant to Counts I, II, and III must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED BY CONVICTING DEFENDANT UNDER COUNT I: 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, U.C.A, SECTION 76-6-408; COUNT II: 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, U.C.A., SECTION 76-6-408; COUNT III: 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, U.C.A., SECTION 76-6-408 BASED UPON 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Defendant now argues that his convictions, pursuant to Counts I, 
II, and III were based upon insufficient evidence. 
A. As argued above under Point I, the record is void of any 
evidence presented by the State at trial which would establish that 
the Defendant received and/or concealed the property. 
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The evidence adduced at trial showed only that: 
— T h e building known as Will's Auto had a "For Rent'1 sign in its 
window (R91 pg. 42, 1. 9-17) 
— T h e building did not belong to the Defendant (R 91 PQ• 36, 1. 
12-23; pg. 152, 1.5-24) 
—Many individuals were seen entering and exiting the building 
known as Will's Auto without use of a key or the doors being locked 
(R 91pg-525 1.8 to pg. 53, 1.7; pg. 54, 1.4-17; pg. 55, 1.4-24; pg. 
56, 1.11-23; pg. 103, 1.9-14) 
—Defendant was never seen in possession of the snowmobile; the 
snowmobile remained some 25-30 feet from the building Defendant was 
seen entering and exiting (R 91 pg. 68, 1.20-25; pg. 69, 1.3-5; pg. 
83, 1.19-22) 
— T h e snowmobile was originally seen parked outside a house 
belonging to another individual (R91 pg.46, 1. 10 to pg. 47, 1.2) 
— T h e U-Haul items were brought to the parking lot of Will's 
Auto by another individual and remained lying on the ground some 
25-30 feet from the building Defendant was seen exiting and entering 
(R91 pg. 68, 1.12-23; pg. 69, 1.3-5) 
It was incumbent upon the State to prove at trial that the 
Defendant has either actual or constructive possession of the stolen 
items. At least as to the snowmobile and the U-Haul equipment, the 
record is void of any evidence that Defendant was in actual or 
constructive possession of the stolen items. At best, the record 
merely shows that these items were located in a parking lot near the 
road some 20-30 feet from the building in which Defendant was seen. 
"Mere proximity to stolen merchandise is not enough to establish 
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dominion or control over it. In addition, mere presence is 
insufficient to establish dominion and control over the premises 
where stolen property is found. (State v. Summers, 728 P2d 613 [Wash. 
App., 1986]; State v. Wilson, 544 So.2d 1300 [La.App. 4 Cir., 1989]) 
All the State showed at trial is that Defendant was in the 
proximity and/or presence of the stolen property and this standing by 
itself is not sufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction. 
B. As argued above under Point I, the record is void of any 
evidence presented by the State at trial which would establish that 
the Defendant received and/or concealed the property on more than one 
occasion. 
C. One cannot be convicted of theft by receiving when the 
actual physical possession of the stolen property had been recovered 
by law enforcement officers before delivery of the property to the 
accused. (State v. Sterling, 640 P2d 1264 [Kan., 1982]) 
Defendant asserts that when Detective Dent and the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Auto Theft Squad went up to Oakley, Utah on February 
16, 1989 and located the stolen 1972 GMC and the Snowmobile, they 
effectively took possession of the items and from that point in time 
forward were the individuals who had possession of the stolen items 
and who were depriving the owner of their possession. (R91 pg. 43, 
1.8 to pg. 47, 1. 22) 
The officers allowed the stolen vehicles to remain on the 
premises at Will's Auto for some twelve (12) days before a search 
warrant was executed. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERR BY CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT UNDER COUNT 
IV (HABITUAL CRIMINAL) WHEN ONE OF THE PREVIOUS UNDERLYING 
FELONIES WAS COMMITTED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL STATUTE (U.C.A. 76-8-1001) 
The statute upon which Count IV of the Information is based, 
U.C.A., section 76-8-1001, was passed by the legislature on March 12, 
1975 and had an effective date of May 13, 1975. One of the crimes 
upon which the Court relied in finding the Defendant guilty under 
Count IV (Habitual Criminal) was a felony which was committed before 
the effective date of the Habitual Criminal statute but for which 
Defendant was sentenced after the enactment date of the statute. 
Defendant argues that under this set of facts the Habitual Criminal 
statute, as applied to the Defendant in this case, acts as an ex post 
facto law in that it proscribes a punishment for crime the defendant 
committed prior to the enactment of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing arguments, Defendant/Appellant requests that 
this Court: 
1. Find that Defendant's convictions under all four (4) counts 
of the information be reversed. 
2. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated this 29th day of November, 1989. 
ELLIOTT LEVINE, Attorne 
for Defendapt/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this 29th day 
of November, 1989, to: 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF UTAH 
236 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
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ADDENDUM 
A, That belonged to Mr, Dumas, as I indicated, 
the jacket was bearing the name Dumas. Other than that, 
they weren't more specifically idendified as belonging to 
him, 
MR. LEVINE: Okay. I don't think I have any 
further questions, Your Honor. I'd ask — well, the 
admission of Defendant's Exhibit 15 into evidence. 
MR. REED: No objection. 
THE COURT: Fifteen is received. Any redirect 
of this witness? 
MR. REED: None, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, deputy, you may step 
down. 
MR. REED: May this witness be excused? 
MR. LEVINE: No objection. 
THE COURT: You're excused as well. 
MR. REED: State will call Larry Andersen, Your 
Honor, 
THE COURT: Call Larry Andersen, please. If 
you'll come forward and be sworn, please, sir. 
LARRY ANDERSEN 
Called as witness in behalf of the plaintiff was 
sworn and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Reed: . 
Page 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Q. Will you state your full name and spell your 
last name, please? 
A. Larry Andersen. 
Q. How is your last name spelled? 
A. An E-N. 
Q. Are you a resident of Salt Lake County? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you residing in Salt Lake County in 
February of 1989? 
A, Yes. 
Q. At any time in February 1989, did you have 
property stolen? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. And did you report that property stolen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did that occur? 
A. I think it was on the 4th of February. 
Q. What property was it that was taken at that 
time? 
A. A truck, 1972 GMC, and a snowmobile. 
Q. Were those items taken at the same time? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. From what location were they taken? 
A. It was a parking lot in Fred Meyers in Salt 
Lake. 
Page 121 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
vehicle insi de the garage, and observations of the 
3k i. -Dou oa tne Monday ~:gnL, which wouic nave oeen the 
2 7th. 
Q, And that would have been o/e: a" v . 
w i i i i iMiJiii1! I.II i < : M ; P . 
A. No, sir. The Ski-Doo was In front ni \::e 
shop on the 27th. 
Q. Okd , I,, l , ,|. I I, |. I M I li.i,! Up t il 1 the 
27th , you never saw t h e Ski-Doo uii Llie p r o p e r t y ; i s tha t 
c o r r e c t ? 
A. I don' 1. [ ei d I I h»n i nrj pen n I I J HUM I I II > i i 
Q. And *• what p o i n t in t ime jnce a g a i n t h e 
i i, in,
 w ,, | ,|M | | | •, i i i Jin you not i red t h e 11-Haul s t u f f ? 
A. That 1 r e c a l l — o\ i , N 
(1-Hau i was seen i n e i P nn t h e S a t u r d a y , t h e 2 5 t h , E 
l„ P 1 i , p • • • 
Q. And you j u s t n o t i c e d i l thei e t h e n , io t h a t 
correct? 
A.; . • i v - i 
Q. ' And once again, that was outside some 
twenty-live c: -hirty feet from the building? 
• A. Twenty I Lhii 1. y 1 fi'l 
Q. Twenty *hirty tee: frorr; * he building. 
• .v- - LU chircy ieet irom t-ne Dui_a.*ng? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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1| Q. • C : /ou notice any tracks around there? 
2 I A. Other than ::acK ^ar<s 
3 Q. v . — -. . :.*als go near those 
4 items at ail? 
5 A. Not when * v-i- --^-«» 
i 
6 Q. Let drawing again, 
7 an*: maybe mark where these items *e, ^  - n ?lat-:n - the 
8 building. 
9 'A. kjy . 
0 Q. Ski-Doo, and maybe just put an S. and a 
c i r c l e f o r r ne \Ik i Onm. 
h. Okay I'lie f r o n t t r a i l e r , a t t h a t t ime t h i s 
v e h i c l e was no l onge r t h e r e . 
Q. 0 h HI v 
A. riidi had been movnl Time t r a i l e r was p a r k e d 
in t h a t f a s h i o n , not q u l ^ e t h a t f a r ou t , somewhat ' " 
fd"ilii i in 1< i HIM ! Lie i i eve was heir- amj I licit Road 
Runner was p a r k e d h e r e . 
11 I nil I i i ) i i ' . e i ' . " id i II ¥h*Lir |J ! i '"' •'" | i | | " 
1
 " J , 1 ' \ e r 3 1!: was e i t h e r h e r e or h e r e , I 
don't ; r e c a l l i f i t was in f r o n t or back . With t h e 
photograph 1 eon hi ml in'in is. h, 111 e n t i, 1 ;, M . 
' '"' And t h e Road Runner,, was t h e Road Runner 
parked in t he same p l a c e , or d i d Miar v e h i c l e keep 
A- '!! I N" J ,l 'Runner remained here when it: uavi 
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been taken off of the trailer. 
Q. Did you ever see it on the trailer? 
A, Yes. On the 25th. 
Q. On the 25th you saw it on the trailer? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you run a license plate check on there? 
A. There wasn't a license plate on the vehicle. 
Q. So you saw it sitting out front on the 
trailer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then after that you just saw it parked 
permanently in front there? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. Did you do any check on that to determine if 
that vehicle was stolen? 
A. There was no way to check. There was no 
license plate, and I obviously couldn't approach the 
building. 
Q. So you don't know if that was legitimately 
there or stolen? 
A. At that time I did not. 
Q. When did you first find out about this 
warrant being issued? 
A. I'm sorry, which warrant? 
Q. The warrant that was executed on the 28th? 
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